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Introduction 
 
 
International Climate Diplomacy after 
the Trump Election Victory 
Germany and the EU Should Intensify Their Outreach to Climate Allies 
Susanne Dröge 
The election of Donald Trump as the new US president heralds difficult times for inter-
national climate policy. The US together with the EU was the key driver of the Paris 
Agreement in 2015. The new president will end climate policy cooperation with China, 
and with other emerging and developing countries. Moreover, he has announced plans 
to reverse the climate-policy legislation which is needed to implement the US climate 
targets. This will undermine the trust many countries have increasingly put in the US 
as a credible climate policy partner who is serious about tackling global warming. Ger-
man and EU negotiators know this challenging situation from the years after the Bush 
administration’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2000. 
In light of the enormous push for international climate policy cooperation over the 
past three years, Germany and the EU need a comprehensive new climate diplomacy strat-
egy to deal with the fallout of the US turnaround. First of all, they need to prevent a chain 
reaction at the international level by pushing, together with their key partners, for the 
Paris Agreement to be implemented. Second, they will have to pay more attention to how 
they interact with the new US representatives joining the negotiations as well as with 
the new US administration. And third, they should limit the damage to climate diplo-
macy and action by cooperating even more closely with US states and non-state actors. 
 
From 2013 onwards, President Barack 
Obama set out a comprehensive climate 
policy agenda (Climate Action Plan), under 
which US emissions were to be reduced and 
international climate cooperation stepped 
up. The US turned from a sluggish partici-
pant into a key player in the UN climate 
negotiations, which at the time were pre-
paring the Paris Agreement (see SWP Com-
ments 34/2014). Secretary of State John Kerry 
started an unprecedented roll-out strategy: 
via a tireless climate diplomacy effort, the 
US moved the reluctant Indian government 
towards more cooperation, overcame the 
long-standing stalemate that kept China 
from international climate policy commit-
ments, and merged further bilateral initia-
tives towards a successful outcome at the 
Paris climate talks. 
At the national level, the Obama admin-
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istration used the president’s executive 
authority, which allows for signing an in-
ternational treaty even without the consent 
of Congress if that treaty’s content does not 
exceed national legislation. In order to bring 
such legislation forward, the administra-
tion built on the 1970 Clean Air Act. 
Backlash against the 
Paris Agreement 
The Trump victory is a severe backlash 
against these processes, in particular 
because the Paris Agreement is merely the 
beginning of a comprehensive internation-
al climate regime that should become effec-
tive from 2020 onwards (see SWP Research 
Paper 4/2016). If the US as the world’s 
largest historical polluter were to pull back 
in 2017, let alone even actively undermine 
the international negotiations, it would be 
very difficult to prevent diplomatic casual-
ties. These could include some of the more 
reluctant countries dropping their support 
for the UN process, which they demonstrated 
by submitting intended nationally deter-
mined contributions (NDCs) in 2015. The US 
has announced emission reductions of 26 to 
28 percent by 2025 as compared to 2005 
figures. The US share of global greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2015 was 15 percent. 
Moreover, the Obama government has 
supported developing countries in Africa 
and Asia as well as the Green Climate Fund 
with unprecedented amounts of money and 
made further climate finance announce-
ments. Given that the US Congress is tradi-
tionally highly critical of foreign aid, the 
new US administration will move to stop 
these commitments as quickly as possible. 
Trump’s agenda? “A Chinese Hoax” 
US president-elect Donald Trump has only 
expressed his view on climate change on a 
few occasions, when he has claimed that 
there is little scientific evidence for it. In 
late November he declared himself open-
minded on the issue. Given that his “Ameri-
ca First” concept favours a far-reaching 
withdrawal of the US from its foreign policy 
commitments, and given that Trump blames 
China for the economic decline of the US, 
there is little doubt that the intensive 
climate policy cooperation with China is 
going to end, which was key for ending the 
bilateral deadlock on global climate protec-
tion in 2014. For his national climate and 
energy agenda, the new President will be 
supported by Congress and the Senate, both 
of which now have a Republican majority. 
He has announced his intention to undo 
the regulations of the Obama adminis-
tration, which include plans to reduce CO2 
emissions from coal-fired power plants 
(Clean Power Plan), methane emissions, 
and efficiency standards, e.g. for fuels. The 
powerful Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), which is in charge of driving the 
regulations forward, is supposed to be re-
organised and its regulatory power signifi-
cantly curtailed. For this agenda, Trump 
chose Myron Ebell from the conservative 
Competitive Enterprise Institute as a mem-
ber of the transition team. Ebell is an out-
spoken climate sceptic. 
More precise plans for Trump’s energy 
policy are laid out in his “America First 
Energy Plan”. In order to reinforce the US’s 
status as an energy super power, he plans 
to foster drilling for gas and oil using frack-
ing. Contrary to some of Trump’s statements, 
however, the US is already independent of 
oil and gas imports. The reversal of federal 
energy regulations is intended to help in-
crease the production of fossil fuels, a move 
supported by many Republicans. Trump has 
nominated Mike McKenna, a long-standing 
fossil-energy lobbyist, to his energy policy 
team. Little is known so far about his renew-
able-energy agenda: Trump’s only remarks 
have been anecdotal and based on false 
figures, e.g. on returns on investment. It is 
widely anticipated, though, that the Trump 
government will terminate federal tax 
breaks for renewable investments. 
The promotion of jobs in the coal indus-
try, many of which have been cut over the 
past decade, was a key feature of Trump’s 
election campaign. Electricity from coal-
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fired power plants has become uncompeti-
tive due to the shale-gas revolution, which 
has led to a 50 percent increase in US gas 
production since 2005, followed by falling 
gas prices and increasing gas-based power 
production. Coal mines were forced to close 
due to the falling coal price, for which even 
the higher coal exports were unable to com-
pensate. In addition, further EPA regulation 
for coal plants has become costly, like its 
enforcement of laws phasing out mercury 
emissions. A promotion of gas drilling 
would further undercut the coal industry’s 
competitiveness. Investors will thus not 
follow up on Trump’s coal-revival rhetoric. 
The international US engagement – 
turning back time? 
To ratify the Paris Agreement (PA), the 
Obama administration bypassed the Repub-
lican-led Congress using the president’s 
executive authority. Unsurprisingly, Repub-
lican resentment of this international deal 
is considerable. President-elect Donald 
Trump announced a withdrawal during his 
campaign, but afterwards retracted his un-
equivocal statement. Since the agreement 
entered into force on 4 November 2016, the 
US government is legally bound by it and 
could only withdraw by applying Article 28 
PA. The withdrawal would take up to four 
years. During this period, the US adminis-
tration would be obliged to delegate staff 
to the UN negotiations, unless new and 
different clauses were agreed for the with-
drawing party. The climate target sub-
mitted by the US as its intended nationally 
determined contribution (NDC) is not legally 
binding under the PA. The only legally bind-
ing obligation is to submit such a contri-
bution. Thus, the US is not obliged to meet 
its NDC. 
Domestically, the US mitigation policy 
builds to a large extent on the Clean Power 
Plan. It stipulates that CO2 emissions from 
power plants should be reduced by 30 per-
cent compared to 2005 levels by 2030. Parts 
of this Plan are subject to pending lawsuits 
at the Supreme Court. However, the ques-
tion whether the Clean Power Plan will 
overcome the legal hurdles has probably 
become moot. Chances are very high that 
the Plan, which is despised by Republicans 
and the coal industry, will be abolished. 
Once a new EPA director is in office, it will 
become clearer whether or not the new 
government will extend its reversal of cli-
mate and environmental policy beyond 
the Obama Climate Action Plan of 2013. 
Abolishing the 1970 Clean Air Act is not an 
option, but its flexibility could be severely 
curtailed. It was this flexibility which 
allowed the EPA to class CO2 as a substance 
harmful to health in 2009, and opened the 
way for Obama to base the national climate-
policy regulations on the Clean Air Act. 
An energy transition in the US states 
The next few months will show how the 
US’s national energy and climate policy and 
action evolves and adds up. This will not 
only depend on how strongly the Republi-
can party pushes for a federal climate-policy 
reversal, but also on how the US states drive 
forward their energy policies, for which 
they have full responsibility. Cities and 
local communities are important players as 
well, and could intensify their clean energy 
initiatives in response to the federal policy 
agenda. Active states are not only found on 
the East and West Coast (New York, Califor-
nia, Washington), but also include Repub-
lican-run states such as Texas and New 
Mexico. They have started to support invest-
ment in renewable energy production to 
diversify their energy markets. In Texas, a 
new boom in solar-energy production is on 
the horizon, after years of dynamic growth 
of wind energy. Over the past 15 years, the 
traditionally oil-dominated state has seen 
an increase in renewable power production 
from a mere 2 percent to 16 percent. In 
2016 there were days when wind energy 
covered 50 percent of total power demand. 
In light of the decreasing cost of renewables 
and falling oil and gas prices, this sector is 
increasingly attractive to investors, in other 
US states as well. This trend would be damp-
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ened if federal tax cuts for renewable in-
vestments were abolished. 
Some US states also put energy and 
climate laws to the vote on 8 November. 
Washington State rejected the introduction 
of a CO2 tax, with environmental groups 
and unions (“Alliance for Jobs and Clean 
Energy”) in particular being critical of the 
plan. They want to see a more socially bal-
anced approach to taxation. Florida de-
clined a proposal for a constitutional right 
to own and lease solar panels, mainly due 
to the fear that subsidies for solar energies 
would be cut in return. Nevada saw a vote 
in favour of energy market liberalisation, 
which potentially opens the way for more 
renewable energy being supplied to the grid. 
International climate policy 
without the US 
In case of the US stopping its national 
climate policy agenda or even leaving the 
Paris Agreement by invoking Article 28 PA, 
centrifugal forces could be unleashed. For 
now the reactions among climate activists 
and progressive countries are rather defiant. 
China responded by requesting that the US 
live up to its announcements. At the Mar-
rakesh conference (COP22) in November 
2016, many participants declared that the 
most ambitious countries should not let the 
US elections get in their way and that pri-
vate money would continue to seek out in-
vestment opportunities in renewables. More-
over, it was pointed out that the newly estab-
lished national and UN institutions for cli-
mate and development finance would be able 
to compensate for the lack of US support. 
Trump’s anti-Chinese campaigning will 
mainly translate into changes to US foreign 
and security policy as well as to trade and 
financial relations. In sharp contrast to 
security or economic policy issues, the US 
and China have been cooperating over the 
past few years on the climate agenda and 
on the Agenda 2030, which sets out Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs). With the 
new US government, Beijing’s most likely 
way forward is to stick to its climate and 
regional trade policy ambitions. By keeping 
up its commitment to the Paris Agreement, 
the Chinese government could not only 
demonstrate its credibility, but actively fill 
the void left by the US, at least in part. Yet 
the Chinese government still lacks the dip-
lomatic tool box to take over a leadership 
role. This role will need to be assumed by 
the EU and its member states, in particular 
Germany. Both the EU and Germany can 
leverage their latest climate policy initia-
tives on developing countries so as to main-
tain confidence in international coopera-
tion. Moreover, the international dynamic 
of climate negotiations still relies heavily 
on the commitment of heads of state and 
governments. This will now be even more 
crucial. The next opportunity for such lead-
ership will be the G20 summit in 2017, 
hosted by Germany. On this occasion, Ger-
many and its allies could show their eco-
nomic interests in setting a reliable and 
ambitious climate-protection agenda. 
Future collaboration with the US should 
shift its focus to non-state actors and the US 
state level. First, the new rulebook for the 
Paris Agreement, which is still being nego-
tiated and is scheduled for completion in 
2018, could scale up the status of non-state 
actors. Second, Europe needs to ensure that 
communication channels are kept open 
and busy with US states, non-governmental 
organisations, political foundations and 
private business, as it did in the years after 
the US’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Proto-
col. German and EU climate diplomats 
should not delay entering into a dialogue 
with these groups on what the foreign-
policy goals, climate-policy priorities and 
strategies could look like during the next 
few years. There is already a wide variety of 
cooperation options with US networks and 
initiatives, which have developed over the 
past two years. Well-established links such 
as the “Transatlantic Climate Bridge” could 
also be enhanced. And last but not least, the 
EU and Germany should turn towards their 
partners from emerging and developing 
countries to sound out the new state of 
affairs in international climate policy. 
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